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It is commonplace enough to observe that
nineteenth century Britain could not forever
maintain her global hegemony. The world's first
industrial power was bound to be challenged by
the rise of modern industrial economies in the
United States, Germany and Japan. Similarly,
the contraction of the capitalist world and the
collapse of colonialism were events over which
Britain had little direct control.
Yet it is not as commonplace to maintain that
ex-colonialist countries are bound to irreversible
decline. While this may have been the main part
of the history of Spain, it has not notably been
the case of postwar France or the Netherlands.
Both countries have achieved a significant
regeneration of their economies in the postwar
period, if not emerged phoenix-like from the
ashes of the war. Similarly, the three countries
which triedand failedto establish world
empires in the 1930s and early l940sGermany,
Italy and Japanhave managed in varying
degrees to achieve what have been heralded as
miracles of modernisation in the postwar period.
Superficially, there would appear to be a
correlation between those economies who lost-
or lost outduring the war and those who won
the economic peace. In the case of the main
Western European continental countries and
Japan, there is some meaning to this. The
ideologies of either fascist or collaborationist
states were discredited, sleepers were weeded or
expelled from national administrations and
company boardrooms, and a career opened to
those with talent and initiative on a scale not
paralleled in postwar Britain. In short, the decks
were cleared for reconstruction.
Yet this alone does not explain the dramatically
higher rates of reconstruction in Germany, Italy,
France and Japan than those in Britain. One
factor certainly was the disproportionate share of
defence and armaments spending in Britain,
relating to her continuing pretension to super-
power status, aided and abetted by a United
States which was content to see Britain take an
excessively heavy share of expenditure for the
Korean war. Another, arguably, was the inability
of Britain to wipe the slate clean on her wartime
debt, and the continuing role which sterling
played as a reserve and trading currency on a
world scale, subjecting her reserves and exchange
rate to pressures of a kind unknown to the other
main European economies and Japan. Besides
which, put simply, it seems clear that sterling was
overvalued through the I 950s, while the Deutsch-
mark was under-valued and the French devalued
without notable inhibition.
There were other factors in the relatively low rate
of economic growth of the postwar British
economy. For instance, while Britain emerged
from the war employing just 1 worker in 20 in
agriculture, the ratio in Japan, Germany, France
and Italy was closer to 1 in S or 1 in 4. In short,
the labour reserves from agriculture on which
these economies could draw during the recon-
struction period were not matched in Britain.
These arguments, made familiar recently by
Verdoorn and Kaldor, and stemming indirectly
from Marx via Kindleberger and Arthur Lewis,
are clearly Felevant to the case argued for growth
with unlimited supplies of labour in the
development economics context.
On the other hand, labour availability is not a
sufficient condition for either growth or develop-
ment. This has been clearly illustrated by postwar
India, but is also apparent from the situation of
the OECD countries today, with their several
million unemployed. Nor is high labour
availabilityeither from shifts out of agriculture,
or immigration, or bothsufficient to maintain
high ratès of growth of capital accumulation.
For instance, growth of gross domestic fixed
capital formation in West Germany fell from an
annual average rate of 9 per cent from 1950-54 to
6 per cent in 1960-64 and to less than 1 per cent
in 1970-74, i.e. a dramatic decline before the
OPEC oil price rises and the recession of the
mid l970s.
The decline in capital accumulation so frequently
overlooked in Germany would be more apparent
during the current recession if two thirds of a
million guest workers had not found their
invitations foreclosed, and returned to their
countries of origin during the l970s. If they had
stayed, they would have increased official German
unemployment figures by more than half to
nearly 7 per centthe highest level in the EEC
and second only to the United States in OECD.
By this kind of criterion it could be argued that
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West Germany has exported her costs of failed
growth to other countries. Certainly, the super-
normal growth rates of the West German
economy in the 1950s, of over 7 per cent GNP
expansion per annum had given way to more
normal rates of 4.5 to 5 per cent by the early
1970s. Similarly, Italy's rapid rate of growth in
the 1950s, dependent essentially on productivity
increases in excess of wages, was checked and
reduced in the later 1960s.
In fact, if there is an economy against whose
overall performance Britain compares poorly, it
is France, who increased her annual average
growth rate throughout the postwar period until
the mid 1970s recession. It is arguable that the
French showed greater capacity to intervene
directly on the supply side of the economy, and
match capacity to demand, than successive
British governments since the war. Yet even in
France, crucial strains on the growth process
emerged, especially in the 1960s. The Fifth
French Plan had scheduled a major allocation
of resources to social expenditure on housing,
health and education. Yet de Gaulle's government
instead concentrated resources on office develop-
ment, large scale computers, a rocket programme,
the nuclear 'force de frappe' and Concorde.
Neglect of social factors in the model of growth
underlay the 'grave social tensions'as the
authorities themselves euphemistically called them
of 1968, and appear to have contributed
substantially to the growing political support for
the Common Programme of the French Left, with
its commitment to 'a new model of development'.
Besides, while Britain's GNP growth may have
been relatively poor for the 25 years following
the war, and averaged less than 3 per cent a year,
the achievements of the post-war Labour govern-
ment in establishing the main framework of a
welfare state could justify the claim that some
of the key objectives of the continental European
Left today were secured before the mid century
in Britain. The National Health Service is the
clearest example. Furthermore, in the 1960s, the
expansion of higher education facilities was
pursued with vigouron lines previously blue-
printed by the Conservativesin contrast with
its atrophy in France.
Nonetheless, by the 1960s, it was becoming
increasingly apparent that something was wrong.
In 1966 the incoming Labour government had
promised a better management of the economy
than the stop-go cycle of the Conservatives, yet
within four months of gaining a major parlia-
mentary majority had introduced a deflationary
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package bringing about the biggest stop to
expansion since the war. This undercut the
pretensions of the National Pian of 1965, and
with it the assumption that the government was
in strategic command of the economy. The 1968
'after-plan', "The Task Ahead", admitted this
bluntly stating that "what happens in industry
is not under the control of the government".
If the Conservative government from 1970 to 1974
frittered away a trend to balance of payments
surplus, the incoming Labour government in 1974
proved itself incapable of implementing new
policies for positive intervention in the supply
structure of industry, and has cut public expendi-
tureor its increaseon a scale which made the
cuts of the 1960s look marginal by comparison.
It committed itself to a detailed package with the
IMF with as little apparent bargaining power as
many a less developed country. It is fairly clear
that it expects the country's economic destiny
to be reversed by North Sea oil. Yet it has
mortgaged this oil revenue against foreign debt
on a major scale, and shows little evidence that
it can take advantage of the relief to the balance
of payments offered by oil self-sufficiency to
regenerate British industry.
Superficially, it might appear that Britain's
economic problem had little to do with develop-
ment or under-development, and was closer to
over-development. But the conventional distinction
between developed and less developed countries
and the identification of development with GNP
performance are unable to explain the unequal
dynamics and incidence of development on a
global scale. Under-development, over-develop-
ment, non-development and anti-development are
more appropriate terms of reference for analysis.
Moreover, the role of non-economic factors in
influencing or obstructing development itself have
come to be admitted as crucial following the false
hopes of many countries in the postwar period.
Further, a society in crisis may incorporate
disjointed or unsynchronised elements of under-
development and over-development in the same
social and economic system.
These factors can be illustrated by the issue of
industry and the supply structure of the British
economy relative to demand management. For
much of the postwar period it was part of the
textbook basics in development economics that
Keynesian policies of demand management were
inappropriate for less developed countries because
the latter lacked the kind of supply structure
which could be 'managed' on the demand side.
Thus a good deal of development economics
focused on supply issues, including in particular
the question of balanced versus unbalanced
growth of particular sectors of industry, with the
debate swinging between the 'big push' case for
concentration on certain basic industries, and the
'broad front' case for across-the-board inter-
sectoral development.
in a so-called developed economy such as Britain,
issues of industrial structure were relatively
neglected in most of the postwar period, such
'micro-economics' being left mainly for maverick
academics to research. They could only be
analysed statistically by means of a 10-year
industrial census in contrast to the monthly or
quarterly price, trade output and employment
figures of the main Keynesian macro-economic
aggregates. This was not simply a matter of
accounting, but reflected the extent to which the
Keynesian ideology of demand management
swept both academic thinking and government
policy-making in the post-war period.
Yet in reality, the postwar industrial structure of
the British economy has become increasingly
imbalanced. The 'big push' from the government
side was towards advanced technology and
especially defence related industry, including
nuclear power, nuclear weaponry, supersonic
aircraft and other sophisticated lines of produc-
tion of questionable income or employment-
generating potential. Neglect of not only
traditional industry, but also the broader range
of modern industrial production has now resulted
in a profoundly imbalanced industrial structure,
with 'de-industrialisation' and chronic contraction
in specific areas of industry such as clothing,
footwear, heavy and light mechanical engineering,
electrical engineering and electronics. Policies of
town and country planning and regional develop-
ment have been partly supply based, but at the
level of individual firms and their location rather
than the interregional balance of industrial
structure. The main thrust of regional policy has
been based on a variant of Keynesian demand
management policy, assuming that capital and
labour incentives both would attract firms to less
developed regions and enable existing firms in the
regions to lower prices thereby giving them
the effect of a regional devaluation relative to the
national and international economy.
Commodity and oil price inflation apart, the result
in the 1970s has been the emergence of crisis in
both economic structure and its spatial distribu-
tion in Britain. It is possible to argue that the
loss of over half a million jobs in manufacturing
is more structural than cyclical, and that the rise of
Scottish and Welsh nationalism, quite apart from
a decade of virtual civil war in Ulster, are in
part manifestations of the regional disintegration
of the UK economy. Besides which, the assumed
'micro-economic' base of the British economy
has been transformed in the post Keynesian era
by the rise of giant companies which both
dominate national economic performance, and
have located abroad on a far higher scale than
our main international competitors. For instance,
whereas the top 100 manufacturing companies in
1950 accounted for about a fifth of manufacturing
output, they now represent about a half of such
output, half of manufacturing employment, more
than half of industrial assets and visible export
trade, and the main part of the price determina-
tion in the economy. These firms represent less
than 1 per cent of the total number of enterprises
in the UK economy, yet account for more than
half of economic activity.
This is a far cry from the supply structure of the
1930s. Its multinational dimension also has major
implications for Keynesian exchange rate policy.
All of the top 100 manufacturing companies are
to a greater or lesser extent multinational in
operation. But the general degree of multi-
nationalisation of the British economy is way in
excess of our leading international competitors
such as Germany and Japan. In fact, the value
of foreign production by British business
operating abroad is more than five times as high
as German or Japanese business and represents
more than twice the value of total UK visible
exports, in contrast with less than two fifths of
national exports by German and Japanese
companies operating abroad. This vast structural
disproportion, compared with such other countries.
may be one of the main reasons for the stubborn
unresponsiveness of UK exports to devaluation.
When leading British businesses operate abroad
on such a scale, they become their own
competitors in key foreign markets, having less
incentive to lower export prices in line with
devaluation, since this would lower the price for
goods they or their subsidiaries already produce.
Put differently, there is a strong case for main-
taining that the British economy now is dominated
on the supply side by a handful of giant enter-
prises which represent a new 'meso-economic'
sector in between the conventional Keynesian
wisdom of macro-micro distinctions. The same
in fact is true of the Japanese economy on the
domestic production side, if not to a greater
extent, with a closer integration of finance and
industrial capital. Also, French planners have
been aiming for 20 years at an industrial structure
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in which 20 per cent of enterprise would account
for 80 per cent of output in any given industry,
and now have achieved a ratio whereby some
2 per cent of enterprises command 80 per cent
of output overall. The difference between Britain
on the one hand, and Japan and France on the
other, lies substantially in the ideology, influencing
government policy formation on the supply side.
In both Japan and France, meso-economic policy
has ante-dated meso-economic theory. Govern-
ments have sought closer and better defined
relations between the State and the big business
which dominate the economy. In Britain, the
mythology of a liberal capitalist competitive
framework still dominates government policy-
making.
These trends have become particularly evident in
Britain of the l970s. In the opening years of the
decade, the Conservative government attempted a
Keynesian Indian summer, boosting demand on
a massive scale in an attempt to break through
to sustained growth on the supply side of the
economy. They failed to take account of the
extent to which big business had already come
to dominate the economy. They thereby ignored
the manner in which forward planning by big
business now spans a time horizon not only
longer than annual budgets, but longer than the
political lifetime of most governments. Similarly,
Labour governments since 1974 have chosen to
disregard the new power structure of big business
in their own party policy programmes, and have
attempted to run the economy without a meso-
micro policy distinction. They have also failed to
understand the extent to which the 'new inflation'
of the later l960s and l970s not only reflects the
raised unit costs of enterprise in the post 1974
recession, but also the price making power of
big business. The latter is encouraged to raise
prices to compensate for lost cash flow during
recession so long as governments do not reflate
demand, and it is able to do so because the
latter do not impose a framework of price controls
on leading enterprises based on more effective
information about their real cost and profit
structures.
This neglect of the supply structure of the
economy in Britain. in contrast with the pre-
occupation with supply in less developed
economies, relates also to the increasing paradox
of the 'dependent development' (or non-develop-
ment) of Britain. With the rise of the US, German
and Japanese economies from the end of the
19th and early 20th century, it was inevitable
that British economic hegemony on a global scale
should be successfully challenged. But the marked
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decline since the war in Britain's economic
standing in both the international economy, and
the international economic community, has not
just been a matter of the relative increase in global
market share of other economies, nor of the
problems of sterling as a reserve and trading
currency in a period when the 'losers' from the
war wiped the slate clean and developed with
restructured national currencies. It lies substan-
tially in the neglect of supply factors underlying
the failure of the planning experiments in Britain
from the introduction of the National Economic
Development Councils and the 1965 National
Plan, to the resistance by the post-1974 govern-
ments to implementing the new dimensions to
planning offered by the Labour Party.
This is illustrated by the contrast between the
restrictions on public expenditure following the
1976-7 IMF loan and the massive public subsidy
of the private corporate sector freely undertaken
by the post-1974 Labour government. The dualism
in British industrial structure between large-scale
multinational capital and smaller scale national
capital is associated closely with dual profit levels
between big and small businesses. By and large,
while size certainly is not a sufficient condition
for competitive success, economies of scale, not
only in production and distribution but also in
access to favourable large scale finance, hold over
buyers and suppliers, brand attachment, etc.-
plus the price 'making' power which comes from
size, has enabled large-scale capital in Britain to
maintain significant profit levels through the 1 970s.
Smaller scale capital, lacking such advantages and
subject to price 'taking' from the consumer,
whether inter-firm buying or final purchases, has
not managed to maintain such profit levels in a
period of commodity, oil and intermediate goods
inflation. Yet the government, in one measure
alonetax relief on stock appreciationgave a
new form of rebate to the private sector equal
to some £3.8bn. after 1974, more than the total
amount of the IMF loan itself. Overall, in
addition to the broad range of rebates on nominal
tax, including especially depreciation allowances,
but also investment grants, R and D write offs
etc., it can be argued that the big league private
sector company either is not paying any effective
corporation tax, or should not be doing so if
it employs a competent accountant within the
framework of the existing legislation.
Put starkly, this represents a situation in which
the British government has shown itself incapable
of harnessing the strong points of the British
economy in order to bring about a planned
expansion of investment, output, productivity and
incomes. As a result, rather than the virtuous
circle assumed to be feasible for developed
economies, the UK has been caught in a classic
vicious circle of stagnant overall investment,
structural unemployment, and depressed expecta-
tions and demand depressed further by the cut-
back in public expenditure. The fiscal crisis in
Britain has been a consequence partly of lost
tax receipts from personal and corporate income
(with falling unemployment and stagnant demand)
but also of the basic failure of the State to tax
the most powerful, potentially productive sections
of the economy: the big business leaders. Welfare
expenditure either has been cut, or financed
through raising public sector borrowing, or
covered through increasingly regressive personal
taxation.
The combination of structural crisis in export
trade, in productive investment and in the tax
system has of course been traumatic for those in
the Labour movement who had come to assume
that rising real public expenditure could be
financed through rising real personal and corpor-
ate incomes. The combination of stagnating invest-
ment, rising unemployment and inflation, which
should not occur in the postwar application of the
Keynesian or neo-Keynesian paradigm, opened
the way for Friedman and monetarism to fill the
apparent void in Keynesian policies. Yet Fried-
manism, and the philosophy of cutting both public
expenditure and the welfare state framework, if
pursued indefinitely, would be likely to open still
further the acute social and economic divisions
in British society.
It is widely recognised that oil alone will not
salvage the British economy. Worse, the dramatic
impact of oil self-sufficiency on the balance of.
payments may temporarily disguise the nature of
the fundamental structural changes in Britain, and
make it possible for a government in power in
the late 1970s and early 1980s to squander the
opportunity to use the breathing space from oil
to restructure policy and the machinery of policy-
making in order to bring about the regeneration
of Britain. Britain will be the only major oil
producer in the world which is also a major
industrial power. Also oil is now backed by the
new coal fields, with resources on a scale which
economies such as Japan and France, without
fuel reserves on a major scale, could well envy.
Yet both Japan and France, in the postwar period,
have exploited their intellectual and organisational
resources in such a way as to overcome their
lack of economic resources per se. Britain at
present shows no such capability.
If Britain is to transcend the current crisis and
transform its economy it will need to do so by
a conscious focus on development rather than
growth, and through a major attempt to refashion
the pioneering vision of the Welfare State to
make it relevant to challenges of the remaining
decades of the century. The full employment
criteria of the postwar period will need
redefinition in such a way as to establish rights
both to equalised employment hours and to
equalised incomes. Social income based on
increased social services will have to be estab-
lished at the heart of the political process as a
right rather than a concession. The social relations
of production will have to be democratised in the
form of workers' control of the labour process.
Such an extension of workers' control is perfectly
compatible with the technical complexity of
modern economic society, provided that essential
macro-economic priorities are planned in the
pace-making in the meso-economic sector. Social
justice in the personal and regional distribution
of employment, income and wealth will have to
be confronted in a manner unparalleled in the last
quarter century.
This is a challenge for which the British labour
movements as opposed to the government, is
potentially well placed. But if the advance is to be
achieved, it will demand a democratisation not
only of the general use of resources in society.
but also of the political process including the
relationships between party and government in
office. It would require more open government, at
both national and local level, with an increased
devolution of decision-making at the regional
level. This would involve not only a reform of the
outdated Official Secrets Act, but also increased
accessibility for community and other pressure
groups to the data with which government
policies are formulated; it also should involve
greater tactical control by regional and local
bodies over the implementation of strategic
national policies. Such policies would amount to
a major reversal of the present concentration of
nominal power in central government. But they
might increasingly be a condition of the exercise
of effective power by governments, based on
extended public debate and consent, rather than
the present crisis situation in which governments
take office without the capacity to exercise
effective power.
The new policies may also demand some adjust-
ment to the at present highly unequal mix in the
public and private sectors of the economy. In
effect, while public expenditure now accounts for
more than half of total spending, public enterprise
represents less than 15 per cent of the contribu-
tion to GDP. The demand and supply sides of the
27
public sector, in this sense, are highly imbalanced.
It is private enterprise, and especially enterprise
in the monopolistic multinational sector, which
dominates the manufacturing industries of the
economythose which the French appropriately
call the 'transformation' industries.
If a new public sector on the supply side is to
avoid the bureaucratisation and deadening hand
of central government inertia, it will need to
incorporate several modes of public ownership,
including central government, local and possibly
regional government, cooperative ownership, and
community development projects. In some cases,
it could involve several such modes on a joint
venture basis, with variable joint ventures with
private sector enterprise and initiative. Such an
approach to a more genuinely mixed economy
need be neither sudden nor centralised. To prove
successful in releasing the initiative and involve-
ment of working people in society. it should be
gradual and progressive. But its extension
nonetheless should be decisive if the new dimen-
sions for a social mode of development, in
consumption and democratic control, are to be
matched on the supply side of the economy which
has been so neglected during the Keynesian era.
The new planning made possible by a re-mix in
the ownership and social control of the supply
side of the economy should be focused on
harnessing and transforming the criteria for use
in the dominant meso-economic sector. In this
sense, Planning Agreements, jointly negotiated
by government, unions and management, should
be used not simply to attempt to make the
prevailing economic structure work at higher levels
of efficiency. but also to change the use of
resources in society. In this sense, a new mode of
development based on social criteria should be
28
brought to the centre of the process of political
debate. It should involve the feasibility of
changing the potential growth rate, and the
manner of development, rather than simply
estimating the potential growth of the system by
present private criteria and technical factors in the
manner of Keynesian or Harrod growth models
(such as underlay much of the reasoning of the
National Plan). The objectives for most working
people are clear enoughthey are the conven-
tional postwar objectives of the Welfare State:
decent housing, health facilities, education,
transport, conditions at work, personal income
and leisure.
The feasibility of achieving such objectives is
greater than before, provided the economic criteria
of the leading enterprises in the systemand
especially the top 100 companiesare related to
the ends of a social and socialised model of
development. This would include constraints on
unlimited foreign expansion by British based
capital, and a closer planned linkage between
supply structure and the new socialised demand
patterns. The chronic imbalance and disproportion
of foreign investmentsubstituting substantially
for visible exportsmay not be a priority for
governments taking a short term perspective
during the coming years in which oil makes
Britain self-sufficient in key fuel needs. But it is
crucial that the capacity to establish strategic
government control over leading enterprise in the
meso-economic sector is secured in the coming
period of oil abundance. Otherwise, Britain will
neglect the lesson underlying the oil price rises
in the 1970s: i.e. the fact that OPEC countries
looked ahead to their prospects 'after oil', and
realised that they had only two to three decades
in which to assure the base for autonomous,
non-dependent development.
